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This article aims to explore the relationship of the shadow economy with the institutional environ-
ment and develop practical recommendations for government policies around the world, and par-
ticularly in Russia. The urgency of the issue under research is caused by the existing need to study 
the shadow economy in order to fi nd ways to reduce its scale and level out its negative externalities. 
Despite the fact that most of the papers focus on tax burden as a fundamental determinant of the 
shadow economy, the authors of this article believe that institutional tools can expand the bounda-
ries of research on the content of the shadow economy as an economic category. Statistical analysis 
of 105 countries with different development levels revealed a stronger correlation between the qual-
ity of institutions and the size of the shadow economy than the one between total tax burden and the 
size of the shadow economy. The fi ndings of this article can be useful in developing state strategies 
for combating the shadow economy and carrying out economic policies of the state as a whole.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Shadow economy is one of the key issues hindering the economic advancement of 
many countries. This phenomenon is not only a private phenomenon of economic 
life and practices; it is a system-forming and system-supporting mechanism of 
social development. This is especially true for developing countries, whose eco-
nomic life is full of shadow activities.
A special attention should not only be paid to the problem of eliminating the 
shadow economy as a socio-economic phenomenon, but rather to a reduction 
in its size and pernicious externalities for society as a whole. The autopoiesis 
of the shadow economy (its self-regulatory nature)1 is caused by imperfection 
of the institutional environment that determines the opportunistic behaviour of 
individuals to carry out market exchanges outside the legal system. Studies of 
the shadow economy began in the 1950s. The origin of the interest in research of 
this phenomenon took place after the publication of works by Kaldor (1956) and 
Cagan (1958). Further studies of the shadow economy dated back to the 1970s, 
when the article of the English anthropologist Hart (1973) was published. In his 
studies commissioned by the International Labour Organization, he found that a 
significant proportion of Ghanaian citizens employed in small and medium-sized 
businesses were virtually independent from the official state economy. 
In the late 1970s, a key focus was on studying the shadow economy in de-
veloped countries, such as the United States (Gutmann 1977; Feige 1979). It 
was subsequently called shadow, illegal, emphasizing not its informal nature, 
but rather its concealment from controlling bodies and an attempt to bypass the 
established state and social institutions. In the same period, a considerable inter-
est was gained in studies of the shadow economy of the Soviet Union (Grossman 
1977; Katsenelinboigen 1977; Kornai 1980). It was discovered that despite strict 
centralisation of the economic system, multifarious segments of the shadow 
economy were operating in the country. It was acknowledged that the shadow 
economy existed in all types of economic systems, generating a specific format 
of socio-economic relations. 
In present researches, the shadow economy is the subject of broad discus-
sions in the scientific community and the interest to this issue is burgeoning, 
notwithstanding that there are certain difficulties associated with measuring its 
1  The concept of autopoiesis refers to a system capable of reproducing and maintaining itself. 
The term was introduced in 1972 by Chilean biologists Humberto Maturana and Francisco 
Varela to define the self-maintaining chemistry of living cells. Since then the concept has 
been applied to the fields of cognition, systems theory and sociology. Luhmann’s adapted the 
concept of autopoiesis to social systems (1995).
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size (Ernste 2002). Primarily, this is due to the lack of statistical data. As a matter 
of fact, it is practically impossible to assess the share of the shadow segment in a 
particular country objectively, since it requires an estimation of economic activity 
that is deliberately hidden by economic agents (Schneider – Williams 2013). In 
this regard, statistical agencies face a number of difficulties in collecting repre-
sentative data for their research.
It is also worth noting that the majority of the papers focus on tax burden as a 
key factor determining the size of the shadow economy (Thomas 1992; Lippert 
– Walker 1997; Johnson 1998; Giles 1999; Schneider 2015). Nevertheless, there 
are also some papers that assume that in the development of the shadow economy 
in multifarious countries the institutional factors are crucial, even more signifi-
cant than the level of tax rates (Johnson et al. 1997; Friedmann et al. 2000). In 
fact, according to the authors’ viewpoint, institutions can more thoroughly inter-
pret the causation of the shadow economy and pinpoint methods to combat it.
The analysis of the scientific literature devoted to the issue of the shadow econ-
omy has revealed the absence of a single methodological approach to its study, 
which does not allow us to formulate the essence and content of this phenomenon 
unequivocally. In this connection, it seems rather perplexing to single out the 
determinants of the shadow economy that directly have an impact on its size. We 
attempted to distinguish the fundamental determinants of the shadow economy 
and substantiate pragmatic recommendations in order to reduce its scale. 
2. THE AMBIGUOUS CONCEPT OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY
There are certain difficulties associated with the unequivocal definition of the 
shadow economy in the scientific community. One of the reasons for the varia-
tions in the definition is the distinction in the methods of measuring and estimat-
ing its size.
Many researchers use the accounting and statistical approach in determining 
the shadow economy, linking it to GDP. For example, this methodology was fol-
lowed by Feige (1980), who noted that the shadow economy is the segment of 
the economy that is not reflected in official statistical information. This is also the 
case in the study of Smith (1994), who maintained that economic agents involved 
in the shadow segments deliberately attempt not to be identified when calculating 
GDP. It should be noted that a serious downside in the application of this meth-
odological approach may be the paucity or imperfection of information on the 
basis of which statistical calculations are to be carried out. 
Another viewpoint on the clarification of the shadow economy is formal in 
which the key attention is paid to the attitude of economic agents towards the 
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regulatory system. The authors who apply this method specify the desire of eco-
nomic agents to bypass government regulations. Studies by Johnson et al. (1997) 
revealed the correlation between the degree of state control and the scale of the 
shadow economy. The excessive overregulation forces the citizens to go into the 
shadow segments.
There is also an institutional approach that combines the principles of account-
ing, statistical, formal and a number of other techniques. In fact, many articles 
were devoted to the shadow economy from the viewpoint of institutional par-
adigm. For example, Friedman et al. (2000), taking into account the study of 
69 countries, discovered that institutions such as bureaucracy, corruption and a 
weak legal environment are all associated with the shadow economy. The work 
of Dreher et al. (2009) established that an enhancement of the institutional envi-
ronment reduces the size of the shadow economy. Schneider (2013) asserted that 
corruption of the bureaucratic apparatus determines the quality of institutional 
environment and plays a fundamental role in the economic agents’ decision to 
conduct their activities in the shadow segment.
We believe that institutional tools expand the boundaries of research of the 
shadow economy as an economic category. According to our viewpoint, tax mor-
al and ethics, bureaucratic corruption, citizens’ trust in government bodies that 
shape the quality of institutional space play an equally important role in deter-
mining the scale of the shadow economy as tax burden. In this regard, it seems 
that the shadow economy is a complex issue; its analysis should not be reduced 
to any one factor, such as the level of tax rates.
3. MEASUREMENTS
3.1. Methodological issues
The data on shadow economy are from the work of Schneider (2016), which con-
tained data of 157 countries for the years of 1999–2013. GDP per capita figures 
were taken from World Economic Outlook for the years of 1980–2017. Other 
indicators were taken from The Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the 
World Economic Forum (Schwab 2013). Our final and complete sample con-
tained 105 developed and developing countries for the years of 2012–2013. 
The analysis contained the following indicators:
1. The size of the shadow economy (% of GDP). The data are collected from 
the MIMIC (multiple-indicator multiple cause) model which was made by Sch-
neider (2016:4), in accordance with whom “the MIMIC model takes into account 
simultaneously different causes and indicators that directly influence develop-
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 119
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
ment of the size of the shadow economy over time.” He included the following 
causal and indicator variables: 
1) Causal variables: tax burden, regulatory burden, unemployment rate, self-
employment rate, institutional quality2.
2) Indicator variables: formal economy, currency/cash outside banks, labour 
force participation rate.
2. Total tax rate (% of profits). This indicator is a combination of profit tax (as 
a % of profits), labour tax and contributions (as a % of profits), and other taxes 
(as a % of profits). The tax burden can be regarded as one of the fundamental rea-
sons that promote an increase in the size of the shadow economy. In our model, 
tax burden is measured by total tax rate as a percentage of profit. The data are 
from Schwab (2013: 543), who explained that “The total tax rate measures the 
amount of taxes and mandatory contributions payable by a business in the second 
year of operation, expressed as a share of commercial profits. The total amount 
of taxes is the sum of five different types of taxes and contributions payable after 
accounting for deductions and exemptions: profit or corporate income tax, social 
contributions and labour taxes paid by the employer, property taxes, turnover 
taxes, and other small taxes.” 
3. Nominal GDP per capita (U.S. dollars per capita). According to our view-
point, low GDP per capita in a country is generally associated with high incentive 
to work in the shadow economy. Elgin – Oztunali (2014) found that the higher 
GDP per capita corresponds to the smaller size of the shadow economy in coun-
tries with high level of the institutional environment. They concluded that the 
relationship between the shadow economy and economic development strongly 
interacts with proxies of institutional quality. GDP per capita is expressed in cur-
rent U.S. dollars per person. The data are from World Economic Outlook (2012, 
2013). 
4. The institutional environment (value). Notwithstanding the significance 
of the tax burden, it should be noted that in some countries in spite of a high tax 
rate, the size of the shadow economy is not so huge compared to the other coun-
tries and this can be justified by the differences in their institutional environment 
(Schneider 2016). As a proxy of the institutional environment in our model, we 
use the value of institutions provided by The World Economic Forum, according 
to which “The institutional environment is determined by the legal and adminis-
2  Note that aside from the tax rate, some institutional indicators that we use as determinants 
of the shadow economy were already included in the calculation of the size of the shadow 
economy as causal variables, i.e. the tax morale, the burden of government regulation and 
the quality of state institutions. Nevertheless, there are also many other indicators that are not 
included in our calculations and that define the size of the shadow economy in Schneider’s 
work.
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trative framework within which individuals, firms, and governments interact to 
generate wealth” (Schwab 2013: 4). The so-called institutional environment was 
made up from 21 different institutional indicators which are presented in the Ap-
pendix by averaging over these indicators. The value of the institutional environ-
ment denotes the country’s score among the selected countries and ranges from a 
scale of 1 to 6 (6-the highest). 
5. Trust in politicians (value). In a state where the citizens have little trust 
in the authorities, the incentive between each party to cooperate is likely to be 
lacking and this leads to an increase in the size of the shadow economy. For this 
reason, the attitude of economic agents towards legislators can be regarded as one 
of the factors that determine the size of the shadow economy. The indicator that 
was taken from the GCR and determined by asking the respondents in each coun-
try the following question under a survey (Schwab 2013: 413): “In your country, 
how would you rate the ethical standards of politicians? [1 = extremely low; 7 = 
extremely high].” After the survey, the weighted average of the indicator in each 
country for the years 2012–2013 was calculated. The value of trust in politicians 
denotes the country’s score among the selected countries and it ranges from a 
scale of 1 to 6 (6-the highest). 
6. Irregular payments and bribes (value). According to Hibbs – Piculescu 
(2005), corrupt legislators intentionally disregard unofficial activities in order to 
get bribes. Furthermore, corruption itself is often an obstacle for businesses to op-
erate within legal frameworks. For this reason it can be regarded as a determinant 
of the size of the shadow economy. The indicator that was taken from Schwab 
(2013: 414) was determined by averaging score across the five components of the 
following Executive Opinion Survey question: “In your country, how common 
is it for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with 
(a) imports and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) award-
ing of public contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favourable judicial decisions?” 
In each case, the answer ranged from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs). The 
value of irregular payments and bribes denotes the country’s score among the 
selected countries and ranges from a scale of 1 to 6 (6-the highest). 
It is important to note that the last two indicators, i.e. trust in politicians and 
irregular payments and bribes, were taken from the list of 21 indicators that make 
up the institutional environment. Besides, some readers may find our calculations 
rather tautological, because Schneider’s estimations of the explained variable, 
i.e. the size of the shadow economy, had already taken into account the tax rate 
and some institutional factors, such as the burden of government regulation, tax 
morale, and the quality of government institutions, i.e. which are used by us as 
explanatory variables.
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The coefficients of Pearson correlation for quantitative variables were calcu-
lated. The significance of correlation coefficients is examined and the regression 
models that characterise the correlation of the shadow economy with other vari-
ables were produced. 
3.2. Results of the statistical analysis 
The hypotheses of the correlations between the size of the shadow economy with 
total tax rate, GDP per capita, institutional environment, trusts in politicians, 
irregular payments and bribes were examined. All variables are represented in 
quantitative value. To measure the dependency between the size of the shadow 
economy and the quantitative values, Pearson’s correlation coefficient was ap-
plied. The results are represented in Table 1.
Table 1. Correlations of quantitative values with the size of the shadow economy
 Indicators  2012 2013
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars per capita) Pearson correlation –0.612 –0.602
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
The institutional environment, value Pearson correlation –0.577 –0.572
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Irregular payments and bribes, value Pearson correlation –0.561 –0.568
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Total tax rate, % of profits Pearson correlation 0.181 0.183
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.064 0.061
Trust in politicians, value Pearson correlation –0.395 –0.417
 Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000 0.000
Source: Own calculations.
On the basis of these coefficients, it is possible to draw a conclusion that GDP 
per capita affects the size of the shadow economy more significantly than any 
other variables presented. Besides, the institutional environment, irregular pay-
ments and bribes also have a strong correlation with the shadow economy. Al-
though it is said that tax burden can be regarded as the fundamental determinant 
of the shadow economy, the results clearly indicate that there is no significant 
correlation between the size of the shadow economy and total tax rate in our 
calculations. 
For further analysis, matrices of pair coefficients of correlation were construct-
ed (Tables 2 and 3) for the years of 2012 and 2013, respectively. It is important to 
note that GDP per capita has remarkably strong correlation with the institutional 
122 T. MAKHMUDOV – M. KONOVALOVA – O. KUZMINA – N. PERSTENEVA 
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
environment (0.777 in 2012 and 0.780 in 2013), trust in politicians (0.632 in 2012 
and 0.673 in 2013) and irregular payments and bribes (0.795 in 2012 and 0.796 
in 2013). This might indicate that higher GDP per capita generally corresponds 
to more developed institutional environment. However, the relationship between 
GDP per capita and the institutional environment does not affect the quality of the 
final models which are presented in Table 4.
Table 2. Matrix of pair correlation coefficients (2012)
Variable 
The size 
of the 
shadow 
economy, 
% of GDP 
The insti-
tutional 
environ-
ment, 
value
Trust in 
politi-
cians, 
value
Irregular 
pay-
ments and 
bribes, 
value
Total tax 
rate, % of 
profits
GDP per 
capita 
(U.S. dol-
lars per 
capita)
The size of the shadow 
economy, % of GDP 
1 –0.577 –0.395 –0.561 0.181 –0.612
(–) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000)
The institutional 
environment, value
–0.577 1 0.862 0.938 –0.098 0.777
(0.000) (–) (0.000) (0.000) (0.318) (0.000)
Trust in politicians, 
value
–0.395 0.862 1 0.747 –0.073 0.632
(0.000) (0.000) (–) (0.000) (0.459) (0.000)
Irregular payments and 
bribes, value
–0.561 0.938 0.747 1 –0.153 0.795
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (–) (0.119) (0.000)
Total tax rate, % profits
0.181 –0.098 –0.073 –0.153 1 –0.118
(0.064) (0.318) (0.459) (0.119) (–) (0.230)
GDP per capita (U.S. 
dollars per capita)
–0.612 0.777 0.632 0.795 –0.118 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.230) (–)
Source: Own calculations.
Note: Pair correlations are in brackets. 
The institutional environment has multicollinearity with trust in politicians 
and irregular payments and bribes which are, in fact, logical since these two vari-
ables were taken from the list of 21 indicators that make up the institutional en-
vironment. Besides, in both cases correlations between these indicators are quite 
strong which is why trust in politicians and irregular payments and bribes were 
excluded from the final models. 
Models that include total tax rate (2nd and 4th models) and exclude this indica-
tor (1st and 3rd models) were constructed in order to compare the quality of the fi-
nal model with and without this indicator (Table 5). Note that coefficients of total 
tax rate both in 2012 and 2013 proved to be insignificant at 95% level of signifi-
cance (nevertheless, this indicator was significant at 80% level of significance). 
Analysis of standardised coefficients reveals that the shadow economy is af-
fected less significantly by total tax rate than by any other regressors. Test of 
short-long regression (after adding total tax rate variable in the model) allows 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SHADOW ECONOMY 123
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
Table 3. Matrix of pair correlation coefficients (2013)
Variable
The size 
of the 
shadow 
economy, 
% of 
GDP 
The insti-
tutional 
environ-
ment, 
value
Trust in 
politi-
cians, 
value
Irregular 
pay-
ments and 
bribes, 
value
Total tax 
rate, % of 
profits
GDP per 
capita 
(U.S. dol-
lars per 
capita)
The size of the shadow 
economy, % of GDP 
1 –0.572 –0.417 –0.568 0.183 –0.602
(–) (0.000 (0.000) (0.000) (0.061) (0.000)
The institutional 
environment, value
–0.572 1 0.883 0.941 –0.130 0.780
(0.000) (–) (0.000) (0.000) (0.186) (0.000)
Trust in politicians, value
–0.417 0.883 1 0.775 –0.086 0.673
(0.000) (0.000) (–) (0.000) (0.382) (0.000)
Irregular payments and 
bribes, value
–0.568 0.941 0.775 1 –0.171 0.796
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (–) (0.082) (0.000)
Total tax rate, % profits
0.183 –0.130 –0.086 –0.171 1 –0.117
(0.061) (0.186) (0.382) (0.082) (–) (0.235)
GDP per capita (U.S. 
dollars per capita)
–0.602 0.780 0.673 0.796 –0.117 1
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.235) (–)
Source: Own calculations.
Note: Pair correlations are in bracets. 
Table 4. Regression models of dependence of the size of the shadow economy 
(5% level of significance)
Variables 1. model (2012)
2. model 
(2012)
3. model 
(2013)
4. model 
(2013)
 –4.526 –4.495 –4.740 –4.551
The institutional 
environment, value (2.162) (2.151) (2.242) (2.237)
 –0.255 –0.254 –0.261 –0.251
 
 
0.057
 
0.058
Total tax rate, % of profits (0.041) (0.043)
 0.109 0.105
 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003 –0.0003
GDP per capita (U.S. dollars 
per capita) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
 –0.413 –0.402 –0.398 –0.394
Constant 57.185 54.375 58.120 54.743
 (7.648) (7.868) (7.875) (8.235)
R2 0.400 0.412 0.390 0.400
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: Standard errors are specified in brackets; standardised coefficients are bold.
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inferring with 95% reliability that adding total tax rate as a variable in the model 
does not enhance the quality of the model.
1. model
The variation in the size of the shadow economy is explained by 40% of the 
variation in value of the institutional environment and GDP per capita. If the 
value of the institutional environment of a country increases by 1 unit, then the 
size of the shadow economy will decrease on average by 4.526 units. 
2. model
The variation in the size of the shadow economy is explained by 41.2% of the 
variation in value of the institutional environment, GDP per capita and total tax rate. 
3. model
The variation in the size of the shadow economy is explained by 39% of the 
variation in value of the institutional environment and GDP per capita. If the 
value of the institutional environment of the country increases by 1 unit, then the 
size of the shadow economy will decrease on average by 4.740 units. 
4. model
The variation in the size of the shadow economy is explained by 40% of the 
variation in value of the institutional environment, GDP per capita and total tax 
rate. 
Models 1 and 3 are significant in accordance with their parameters and reliable 
by 95%. According to the White test, the heteroscedasticity in models’ residuals 
is absent.
To summarise the results, it can be stated that a sample of 105 countries with 
different levels of development proved our thesis that the institutional environ-
ment and the size of the shadow economy have a stronger correlation than total 
tax burden and the size of the shadow economy. 
3.3. Scandinavian and developing countries as examples
The significance of the institutional environment in determining the size of the 
shadow economy can be also disclosed by juxtaposing utterly disparate countries 
in terms of the quality of institutions. By comparing developed Scandinavian 
countries with less developed European countries, it can be noticed that in spite 
of a heavy tax burden in Sweden, Norway and Finland, the scope of the shadow 
economy in these countries is considerably lower than in less developed countries 
such as Albania, Moldova and Kazakhstan, in which total tax rates are distinctly 
lower (Figure 1). 
This phenomenon can be justified by contrasting other factors which deter-
mine the size of the shadow economy. For instance, the states under comparison 
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substantially differ in terms of the level of trust in politicians and the number of 
irregular payments and bribes which define the quality of the institutional envi-
ronment in the country. Thus, according to the GCR the Scandinavians take the 
leading positions among 148 countries in the rating of the quality of institutions 
whereas Kazakhstan, Albania, and Moldova occupy far more modest positions 
(Table 5). 
The Scandinavians, unlike the other countries under comparison, concede and 
agree to redistribute considerable volume of tax payments in favour of the state 
since they have managed to create reciprocal beneficial relations between the 
citizens and politicians and this can be approved by examining their positions 
Figure 1. Size of the shadow economy and total tax rate in European countries, 2013
Source: Based at Schneider (2016) and Schwab (2013).
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Table 5. Rank of the institutional environment (out of 148 countries), 2013
Country Rank of the institutional 
environment
Trust in politicians Irregular payments and 
bribes
Finland 1 7 2
Sweden 5 6 10
Norway 6 4 6
Kazakhstan 55 35 65
Albania 118 99 118
Moldova 122 118 114
Source: Based at Schwab (2013).
126 T. MAKHMUDOV – M. KONOVALOVA – O. KUZMINA – N. PERSTENEVA 
Acta Oeconomica 68 (2018)
in the rank of trust in politicians. The Scandinavians are confident that the state 
institutions provide all the necessary public benefits. 
The aforementioned comparison clearly exemplifies that the tax burden alone 
cannot be a representative determinant of the shadow economy and other fac-
tors must be taken into consideration in analysing the shadow economy as well 
to derive more accurate results of research. These factors have a synergy effect 
in the same institutional conditions that makes an essential impact on the size of 
the shadow economy and leads to its expansion whereas in other conditional fac-
tors, levelling each other, promote fixing and even narrowing of the scope of the 
shadow economy. 
3.4. Comparison of the size of the shadow economy and the institutional 
environment in Russia, India, China and the USA
While investigating the size of the shadow economy of the leading countries in 
terms of GDP, Russia is allocated most of all, in which the fraction of the shadow 
economy in percentage to GDP exceeds the identical indicators of other countries 
such as the USA, India and China (Figure 2). There is also a remarkable tendency 
of the share of the shadow economy to growth during the time period from 2000 
to 2013. On the contrary, the scales of the shadow economy in the USA, India 
Figure 2. Size of the shadow economy
Source: Based at Schneider (2016). 
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and China remained approximately at the same level throughout the identical 
time interval.
It is important to mention that the level of tax burden cannot justify the strong 
contrast between the scope of the shadow economy in Russia and in other coun-
tries under comparison. For instance, the share of total tax rate in Russia is ap-
proximately at the same level as in the USA. Besides, the fraction of the tax 
burden in Russia is significantly lower than in China and India (Figure 3). In this 
regard, it is reasonable to specify a remarkable insufficiency of the tax burden as 
a determinant which can intransigently provide an explanation for differences in 
the size of the shadow economy. 
The enormous size of the shadow economy in Russia can be explained by pro-
ceeding not from the distinctions in tax burden but from the other determinant of 
the shadow economy, that is, the quality of the institutional environment. By jux-
taposing the rank of the institutional environment in the countries under compari-
son (Figure 4), it is possible to notice that the better the quality of the institutional 
environment, the smaller the scale of the shadow economy. Indeed, among these 
countries, the leading position in The Rank of Institutional Environment made by 
The World Economic Forum is taken by the USA, in which a share of the shadow 
economy is the smallest. After the USA there are China and India, respectively, 
which are located in the identical sequence when comparing scales of the shadow 
economy in them. The worst results are shown by Russia, which has taken the 
Figure 3. Total tax rate, % of profits
Source: Based at Schwab (2013). 
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lowest positions in the rating for many years that, according to authors, can serve 
as justification of such immense size of the shadow economy in this country. 
We are assured that an improvement in the institutional environment in Russia 
is capable to reduce the size of the shadow economy which, subsequently, will 
enable to enhance competitiveness of this country’s economy and create auspi-
cious conditions for economic growth.
4. WEAK INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT AS THE MAIN CAUSE 
FOR THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN RUSSIA
In the early 1990s, there was a widespread assumption in the Russian scientific 
community that transition of the country to a market economy will lift a ban from 
entrepreneurship for citizens, and will correspondingly reduce the size of the 
shadow economy. On the contrary, not only did the collapse of the Soviet Union 
not promote it, it actually caused the expansion of the size of the shadow econo-
my. This can be confirmed by the rapid emergence and increase in the number of 
financial pyramids (Ponzi schemes) during that period. Lack of regulating tools 
capable to coordinate the activity of financial pyramids and to withstand them 
became the reason for that. In this regard, there was a huge loss in Russian citi-
zens’ savings.
Figure 4. Rank of the institutional environment (out of 148 countries)
Source: Based at Schwab (2013).
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Another negative implication of the collapse of the Soviet Union was the tran-
sition of big business to the political elite during privatisation of the state enter-
prises. The merger of institutes of property with institutes of power set in motion 
the emergence of large oligarchic structures, redistributing natural resources rent 
in their favour. Knowing and having certain levers to pressurize the government 
and using corruption methods along with shadow schemes of doing business, the 
oligarchical cell promoted the expansion of scales of the shadow economy.
Formation of the present institutional system occurred under the influence of 
corruption interests of bureaucracy and political interests of the upper echelons of 
the government. This undermined the credibility of citizens towards the authori-
ties. Confrontation of formal and informal institutes had resulted in the destabili-
sation of the whole institutional system in general, and that promoted the expan-
sion of the shadow segments. The latter arise when economic agents are excluded 
from the system of formal institutes, or they try to bypass them.
According to the approach of new institutionalists, changes arise as the result 
of external shocks such as perturbations in the economy which require reorgani-
sation of institutes (Schneiberg 2005). In Russia, however, external shocks did 
not promote an improvement of the institutional environment since the economic 
crisis of 2008–2009 and the oil crisis of 2014–2015 could not bring Russia out of 
the stagnant state and thereby reduce the scales of the shadow economy.
In this regard it seems that the initiator of institutional changes in Russia should 
not be the external phenomena, such as crises, but the internal ones, expressed 
as actions of the authorities. It is construed in the research of Levin – Satarov 
(2000), who noted the necessity of economic, political and juridical reforms as 
the tools that are capable to reduce the size of the shadow economy.
We infer that institutional changes which may be expressed, for example, in 
legalisation of certain segments of the shadow economy, can become one of the 
ways of decreasing it and mitigating its consequences. The Peruvian economist 
de Soto (2000) discoursed upon the fact that this can be carried out by means of 
capital amnesty.
Legalisation of certain types of the shadow activity will provide entrepreneurs 
with an opportunity to bring their business out of the shadow without any nega-
tive consequences for them. It is possible to notice positive effects of such insti-
tutional changes employing the example of the Soviet Union modification. In 
particular, the Cooperation in the USSR Law and Individual Labor Activity Law, 
which were passed in the late 1980s, were promoted and citizens began to register 
their shadow kinds of activity, thereby reducing the shadow sector as a whole. 
The legalised assets promoted their further coordination and mobilisation of re-
sources for further economic development.
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The significant role of the steady decrease in the size of the shadow economy 
belongs to the effectively functioning entrepreneurial institutions. Its formation 
in Russia occurred in the period of transformation of the economic system and 
was caused rather by the institutional necessity, than by the economic expedi-
ency. In this regard, a reduction in venality of the bureaucratic apparatus along 
with the degree of overregulation of business will hopefully promote an increase 
in efficiancy of the business institutions, and, therefore, will lead to narrowing 
down the size of the shadow economy.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Shadow economy, as a social and economic phenomenon, is represented as an 
autopoietic (self-reproducing) system which is primarily determined by the fol-
lowing factors: 1) tax burden; 2) tax morale and ethics, corruptness of the bu-
reaucratic apparatus, trust of citizens to public authorities that form the quality of 
the institutional environment. The institutional environment plays a crucial role 
in determining the attitude of an economic agent towards the laws that defines 
whether to obey formal standards and rules or circumvent them. The growth of 
private transaction expenses resulting from conducting business activity in ac-
cordance with all formal requirements promotes runoff of entrepreneurs in the 
shadow segment. At the same time, an increase in the volume of transaction ex-
penses caused by imperfection of the institutional environment can be amelio-
rated by the governmental initiatives.
It appears that institutional changes are necessary for a reduction in the size of 
the shadow economy in developing countries such as in Russia. They are capable 
to create a structural institutional alternative, which could satisfy the interests of 
all categories of the population. This compromise can promote coordination of 
formal and informal institutes that will increase the quality of the institutional en-
vironment and, therefore, will serve for economic agents as an impetus for with-
drawal from certain types of shadow segments. This can be achieved by building 
reciprocal relationships between entrepreneurship institute and the authorities 
through realisation of lines of their interaction. It is also necessary to create an 
adequate institutional infrastructure for businesses in order to facilitate their func-
tioning which should form the conditions for the development of the competitive 
environment. 
Implementation of the aforementioned actions will provide the higher quality 
of the institutional environment which will enhance both the level of credibility 
of citizens towards the state and the degree of trust of authorities towards eco-
nomic entities and therefore reduce the size of the shadow economy.
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APPENDIX
Table 1. The indicators that define the institutional environment and their weight
A. Public institutions 75% B. Private institutions
1. Property rights 20% 1. Corporate ethics
 1.01 Property rights  1.17 Ethical behaviour of firms
 1.02 Intellectual property protection
2. Ethics and corruption 20% 2. Accountability
 1.03 Diversion of public funds
 1.04 Public trust in politicians
 1.05 Irregular payments and bribes
3. Undue influence
 1.06 Judicial independence
  1.07 Favoritism in decisions of 
government officials
4. Government efficiency
  1.08 Wastefulness of government 
spending
 1.09 Burden of government regulation
  1.10 Efficiency of legal framework in 
settling disputes
  1.11 Efficiency of legal framework in 
challenging regulations
  1.12 Transparency of government 
policymaking
5. Security
 1.13 Business costs of terrorism
  1.14 Business costs of crime and 
violence
 1.15 Organised crime
 1.16 Reliability of police services
  1.18 Strength of auditing and 
reporting standards
 1.19 Efficacy of corporate boards
  1.20 Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests
20%  1.21 Strength of investor protection
20%
20%
Note: Weight (%) within immediate parent category.
Source: Made by the authors based on Schwab (2013).
 
